A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service
Research output: Working paper › Research
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A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service. / Barfort, Sebastian; Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe; Hjorth, Frederik Georg; Olsen, Asmus Leth.
2015.Research output: Working paper › Research
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TY - UNPB
T1 - A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service
AU - Barfort, Sebastian
AU - Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe
AU - Hjorth, Frederik Georg
AU - Olsen, Asmus Leth
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Recent empirical studies have found that in high corruption countries, inherently moredishonest individuals are more likely to want to enter into public service, while the reverseis true in low corruption countries. In this note, we provide a simple formal model thatrationalizes this empirical pattern as the result of countries being stuck in different selfsustainingequilibria where high levels of corruption and negative selection into publicservice are mutually reinforcing.
AB - Recent empirical studies have found that in high corruption countries, inherently moredishonest individuals are more likely to want to enter into public service, while the reverseis true in low corruption countries. In this note, we provide a simple formal model thatrationalizes this empirical pattern as the result of countries being stuck in different selfsustainingequilibria where high levels of corruption and negative selection into publicservice are mutually reinforcing.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - corruption
KW - dishonesty
KW - public service motivation
KW - experiments
KW - dice game method
M3 - Working paper
BT - A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service
ER -
ID: 144009135