Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Volume | 144 |
Pages (from-to) | 204-218 |
ISSN | 0167-2681 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2017 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - Political selection, Pro-social behavior, Social dilemma, Corruption, Voting, C92, C91, D03, D72, H41
Research areas
ID: 186156349