Judicial Influence on Policy Outputs? The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union
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Judicial Influence on Policy Outputs? The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union. / Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg.
In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, No. 12, 5, 2015, p. 1612-1660.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Judicial Influence on Policy Outputs?
T2 - The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union
AU - Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - The ability of courts to generate political change has long been debated in national, comparative, and international politics. In the examination of the interaction between judicial and legislative politics, scholars have disagreed on the degree of judicial power and the ability of politics to override unwanted jurisprudence. In this debate, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has become famous for its central and occasionally controversial role in European integration. This article examines to what extent and under which conditions judicial decisions influence European Union (EU) social policy outputs. A taxonomy of judicial influence is constructed, and expectations of institutional and political conditions on judicial influence are presented. The analysis draws on an extensive novel data set and examines judicial influence on EU social policies over time, that is, between 1958 and 2014, as well as for case studies of working-time regulations and patients’ rights. The findings demonstrate that both the codification and overriding of judicial decisions are unlikely in the contemporary EU-28 of fragmented politics. However, modification and nonadoption constitute other political responses to attenuate unwelcome jurisprudence and constrain the legislative effect of judicial decisions.
AB - The ability of courts to generate political change has long been debated in national, comparative, and international politics. In the examination of the interaction between judicial and legislative politics, scholars have disagreed on the degree of judicial power and the ability of politics to override unwanted jurisprudence. In this debate, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has become famous for its central and occasionally controversial role in European integration. This article examines to what extent and under which conditions judicial decisions influence European Union (EU) social policy outputs. A taxonomy of judicial influence is constructed, and expectations of institutional and political conditions on judicial influence are presented. The analysis draws on an extensive novel data set and examines judicial influence on EU social policies over time, that is, between 1958 and 2014, as well as for case studies of working-time regulations and patients’ rights. The findings demonstrate that both the codification and overriding of judicial decisions are unlikely in the contemporary EU-28 of fragmented politics. However, modification and nonadoption constitute other political responses to attenuate unwelcome jurisprudence and constrain the legislative effect of judicial decisions.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - law and politics
KW - judicial influence
KW - legislative politics
KW - Europen Union
KW - interinstitutional dynamics
U2 - 10.1177/0010414015592591
DO - 10.1177/0010414015592591
M3 - Journal article
VL - 48
SP - 1612
EP - 1660
JO - Comparative Political Studies
JF - Comparative Political Studies
SN - 0010-4140
IS - 12
M1 - 5
ER -
ID: 137629843