The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy: The Freedom Argument
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The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy : The Freedom Argument. / Rostbøll, Christian F.
In: Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, Vol. 22, No. 2, 06.2015, p. 267-278.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy
T2 - The Freedom Argument
AU - Rostbøll, Christian F.
PY - 2015/6
Y1 - 2015/6
N2 - A current debate in democratic theory concerns whether we can explain democratic legitimacy purely with reference to the intrinsic value of the public affirmation of equality, or whether we must invoke extra-democratic epistemic standards to do so. The freedom side of democracy is ignored or even rejected in this debate. But in order to understand the intrinsic value of democracy, we cannot ignore the relationship between freedom and democracy. Moreover, the freedom argument can better respond to the epistemic challenge to intrinsic accounts than can the equality argument. However, the freedom argument for democracy must be refined to avoid important objections to the idea that democracy can make citizens self-governing. The proposed freedom argument is based on notions of autonomy and freedom that have their root in the relational norm of not having another person as a master.
AB - A current debate in democratic theory concerns whether we can explain democratic legitimacy purely with reference to the intrinsic value of the public affirmation of equality, or whether we must invoke extra-democratic epistemic standards to do so. The freedom side of democracy is ignored or even rejected in this debate. But in order to understand the intrinsic value of democracy, we cannot ignore the relationship between freedom and democracy. Moreover, the freedom argument can better respond to the epistemic challenge to intrinsic accounts than can the equality argument. However, the freedom argument for democracy must be refined to avoid important objections to the idea that democracy can make citizens self-governing. The proposed freedom argument is based on notions of autonomy and freedom that have their root in the relational norm of not having another person as a master.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - debate
U2 - 10.1111/1467-8675.12159
DO - 10.1111/1467-8675.12159
M3 - Journal article
VL - 22
SP - 267
EP - 278
JO - Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory
JF - Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory
SN - 1351-0487
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 122335120