Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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- 0624
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We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among other subjects in their group. We find that cooperation and efficiency increases substantially with this redistribution scheme, and that the redistribution option is popular. Our results provide an intuitive explanation for why an imposed redistribution rule, as proposed by Falkinger (1996), is capable of sustaining cooperation in the provision of public goods
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Udgivelsessted | Cph. |
Udgiver | Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen |
Antal sider | 7 |
Status | Udgivet - 2006 |
Bibliografisk note
JEL Classification: C9, H41
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