Procurement with specialized firms

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Standard

Procurement with specialized firms. / Boone, Jan; Schottmüller, Christoph.

I: RAND Journal of Economics, Bind 47, Nr. 3, 2016, s. 661-687.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Boone, J & Schottmüller, C 2016, 'Procurement with specialized firms', RAND Journal of Economics, bind 47, nr. 3, s. 661-687. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12143

APA

Boone, J., & Schottmüller, C. (2016). Procurement with specialized firms. RAND Journal of Economics, 47(3), 661-687. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12143

Vancouver

Boone J, Schottmüller C. Procurement with specialized firms. RAND Journal of Economics. 2016;47(3):661-687. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12143

Author

Boone, Jan ; Schottmüller, Christoph. / Procurement with specialized firms. I: RAND Journal of Economics. 2016 ; Bind 47, Nr. 3. s. 661-687.

Bibtex

@article{58eab9c49bf64d90bfdde0ca22673170,
title = "Procurement with specialized firms",
abstract = "This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms when firms are specialized. The procurement agency has incomplete information concerning the firms{\textquoteright} cost functions and values high quality as well as low price. Lower type firms are cheaper (more expensive) than higher type firms when providing low (high) quality.With specialized firms, distortion is limited and a mass of types earns zeroprofits. The optimal mechanism can be inefficient: types providing lower second best welfare win against types providing higher second best welfare. As standard scoring rule auctions cannot always implement the optimal mechanism, we introduce a new auction format that implements the optimal mechanism.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, procurement, specialized firms, deregulation, countervailing incentives",
author = "Jan Boone and Christoph Schottm{\"u}ller",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1111/1756-2171.12143",
language = "English",
volume = "47",
pages = "661--687",
journal = "RAND Journal of Economics",
issn = "0741-6261",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Procurement with specialized firms

AU - Boone, Jan

AU - Schottmüller, Christoph

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms when firms are specialized. The procurement agency has incomplete information concerning the firms’ cost functions and values high quality as well as low price. Lower type firms are cheaper (more expensive) than higher type firms when providing low (high) quality.With specialized firms, distortion is limited and a mass of types earns zeroprofits. The optimal mechanism can be inefficient: types providing lower second best welfare win against types providing higher second best welfare. As standard scoring rule auctions cannot always implement the optimal mechanism, we introduce a new auction format that implements the optimal mechanism.

AB - This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms when firms are specialized. The procurement agency has incomplete information concerning the firms’ cost functions and values high quality as well as low price. Lower type firms are cheaper (more expensive) than higher type firms when providing low (high) quality.With specialized firms, distortion is limited and a mass of types earns zeroprofits. The optimal mechanism can be inefficient: types providing lower second best welfare win against types providing higher second best welfare. As standard scoring rule auctions cannot always implement the optimal mechanism, we introduce a new auction format that implements the optimal mechanism.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - procurement

KW - specialized firms

KW - deregulation

KW - countervailing incentives

U2 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12143

DO - 10.1111/1756-2171.12143

M3 - Journal article

VL - 47

SP - 661

EP - 687

JO - RAND Journal of Economics

JF - RAND Journal of Economics

SN - 0741-6261

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 156337866